Abstract. Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is a new asymmetric encryption paradigm which was introduced to solve the certificate management problem in traditional public key encryption (PKI). It combines PKE and identity-based encryption (IBE) while preserving some of their most attractive features. CBE provides an efficient implicit certificate mechanism which eliminates the thirdparty queries and simplifies the certificate revocation problem in the traditional PKI. It also solves the key escrow problem and key distribution problem inherent in IBE. In this paper, we introduce the key replacement attack and the malicious-but-passive certifier attack into CBE, and define a class of new security models for CBE under different security levels according to the power of the adversaries against CBE. Our new security models are more elaborated and stronger compared with other existing ones. Then, we propose a generic construction of CBE from certificateless public key encryption and prove its security under the proposed security models in the standard model. We also show a concrete conversion using the proposed generic construction.
Introduction
In traditional public key cryptography (PKC), cryptographic keys are generated randomly with no connection to users' identities. Therefore, it is infeasible to prove that a party is indeed the holder of a given public key. This problem can be solved by introducing public key certificates generated by a trusted third party called the Certification Authority (CA) that can provide an unforgeable and trusted link between a public key and the identity of its holder. This kind of certificate systems is referred to as the Public key Infrastructure (PKI). However, the need for PKI-supporting certificates is considered as the main difficulty in the deployment and management of traditional PKC. To simplify the management of the public key certificates, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC) in which the public key of each user is derived directly from its identity, such as an IP address or an e-mail address, and the corresponding private key is generated by a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG). Rather than obtaining the disparate public keys and the certificates of its intended recipients separately as is done in traditional PKC, a message sender who knows the identities of its recipients needs only to obtain the public parameters of the PKG. Therefore, the main practical benefit of IBC lies in great reduction of need for public key certificates. However, the PKG can generate the private keys of all its users, so private key escrow becomes an inherent problem in IBC. Moreover, private keys must be sent to the users over secure channels. It makes private key distribution a daunting task.
To fill the gap between traditional PKC and IBC, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] proposed a new paradigm called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) in 2003. In CL-PKC, a trusted third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) is involved in the process of issuing a partial secret key for each user. The user independently generates its public/private key pair and combines the partial secret key from KGC with its private key to generate the final decryption key. This way, KGC does not know the decryption key of any user. Therefore, CL-PKC solves the key escrow problem inherent in IBC. However, due to the lack of public key certificate to ensure the authenticity of the user's public key, it is important to assume that an adversary in the certificateless system can replace the user's public key with a false key of its choice, which is also known as key replacement attack. Cryptographic protocols in certificateless system are easily suffered from this kind of attack. Moreover, partial secret keys must be sent to the users over secure channels. It makes CL-PKC suffer the same key distribution problem as IBC.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [3] introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE), which combines identity-based encryption (IBE) and traditional PKI-supporting public key encryption (PKE) while preserving some of their most attractive features. CBE provides an implicit certificate mechanism and allows a periodical update of certificate status. As in the traditional PKE, each user generates his own public/private key pair and requests a certificate from a trusted third party, which is called as the certifier. The certifier generates a certificate as in a traditional PKI and is responsible for pushing a fresh certificate only to the holder of the public key at beginning of each time period. A certificate in CBE has all the functionalities of a traditional PKI certificate, and also acts as a partial decryption key. This additional functionality provides an implicit certificate mechanism so that the sender is not required to obtain fresh information on certificate status and the recipient can only decrypt the ciphertext using his private key along with an up-to-date certificate from its certifier. The feature of implicit certificate allows us to eliminate third-party queries for the certificate status and to simplify the public key revocation problem so that CBE does not need infrastructures like CRL and OCSP. Therefore, CBE can be used to construct a more efficient the new definition is still not satisfactory. Inspired by the definitions of security models for CL-PKE [25] and CBS [26] , we introduce the key replacement attack and the malicious-but-passive certifier attack into CBE, and define a class of new security models for CBE. We also divide these security models into different security levels according to the power of the adversaries against CBE so that our definitions will provide a systematic approach for analyzing the exiting CBE schemes and constructing new CBE schemes. The second contribution is that we make a further investigation on the relationship between CBE and CL-PKE. As discussed in [12] , CBE and CL-PKE are two similar concepts, and also share some common features. In [6] , Yum and Lee showed that CBE and CL-PKE can be constructed from two IBE schemes. So CBE and CL-PKE can be constructed from each other via two intermediate IBE schemes. However, the direct conversion from CL-PKE to CBE still remains open. In this paper, we resolve this open problem by proposing a new generic construction of CBE from CL-PKE in the standard model.
Definition of Certificate-Based Encryption
In a CBE scheme, a certificate generator, which is called as the certifier, will first generate the system parameter including a master key and a list of public system parameters. The certifier will use the system parameter to generate certificates for users in the system. Users then will generate their own public/private key pairs and contact the certifier to obtain the corresponding certificates. A user should use its private key and the certificate from the certifier as the decryption key to decrypt the ciphertext received. The following definition of CBE is modified from [12] , where the original definition given by Gentry in [3] was reconsidered.
Definition 1.
A CBE scheme is a 5-tuple of polynomial time algorithms (CBSetup, CB-SetKeyPair, CB-Certify, CB-Encrypt, CB-Decrypt) such that:
− CB-Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a certifier that takes a security parameter k and a total number of time periods N as input, and outputs a master key CB-msk and a list of public parameters CB-params that include the descriptions of a finite identity information space IDSPC CB , a finite plaintext space MSPC CB and a finite ciphertext space CSPC CB . − CB-SetKeyPair is a probabilistic algorithm run by a user that takes the public parameters CB-params as input, and outputs a public/private key pair (CB-PK, CB-SK). − CB-Certify is a deterministic or probabilistic algorithm run by a certifier that takes the public parameters CB-params, the master key CB-msk, an index τ ∈ [0, N-1) of the current time period, an identity id ∈ IDSPC CB and a public key CB-PK as input, and outputs a certificate CB-Cert τ which is sent to the user with identity id through an open channel.
− CB-Encrypt is a probabilistic algorithm that takes the public parameters CB-params, an index τ ∈ [0, N-1) of the current time period, an identity id ∈ IDSPC CB , a public key CB-PK and a plaintext M ∈ MSPC CB as input, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ CSPC CB . − CB-Decrypt is a deterministic algorithm that takes the public parameters CB-params, a private key CB-SK, a certificate CB-Cert τ and a ciphertext C as input, and outputs either a message M ∈ MSPC CB or a special symbol ⊥ indicating a decryption failure.
Correctness. It is required that CB
, where (CB-PK, CB-SK) is a valid public/private key pair generated by CBSetKeyPair on input <CB-params> and CB-Cert τ is a valid certificate generated by CB-Certify on input <CB-params, CB-msk, τ, id, CB-PK>. Remark 1. In [12] , the definition of CBE includes a certificate consolidation algorithm CB-Consolidate which is run by each user to take <CB-params, τ, id, CB-Cert τ > and optionally CB-Cert ' τ-1 as input and to generate the final certificate CB-Cert ' τ used by the user id in the time period τ. However, we note that a concrete CBE scheme need not involve certificate consolidation. In this situation, the algorithm CB-Consolidate will simply output CB-Cert ' τ = CBCert τ . Since this algorithm is not used in almost all the existing CBE schemes, we also omit this algorithm in this paper.
Security Models for Certificate-Based Encryption
Roughly speaking, the security of a CBE scheme requires that a user with the identity id can decrypt a valid ciphertext generated in the time period τ under the public key CB-PK if and only he has the correct CB-SK and CB-Cert τ . In other words, he cannot recover the plaintext from a valid ciphertext correctly with only CB-SK or CB-Cert τ .
In [3] and [12] , the security models for CBE are both defined by two types of adversaries: Type-I adversary and Type-II adversary, where Type-I adversary models an uncertified client who has not the legitimate certificate and Type-II adversary models a malicious certifier in possession of the master secret key. Different from the original security model in [3] where the challenger against Type-II adversary is allowed to work with multiple values of the public system parameters, the security model in [12] requires that the public parameters and master key are fixed and supplied to Type-II adversary at the beginning of the simulation. Kang and Park [13] pointed out that this restriction is sufficiently reasonable because a certifier does not change its public parameters frequently in practice. However, both these two security models may be not elaborated and strong enough for the practical applications. For example, these two security models both require that Type-I adversary should provide a private key along with the corresponding public key in all of decryption oracle queries. This restriction enables the challenger to handle these decryption queries, but is unnecessary and also restricts the ability of Type-I adversary. Actually, the challenger can handle decryption queries using some special purpose knowledge extractors without requiring the adversary to provide the private key. Besides this, both these two security models do not consider the key replacement attack. It seems that the key replacement attack does not exist in CBE due to the use of certificates. However, in CBE only the owner needs to check the validity of its certificate and other users do not need. Therefore, such attack actually does exist. A concrete example is the status CBE scheme proposed by Yum and Lee [14] . In [15] , this scheme is pointed out to be insecure under the key replacement attack. Since a reasonable and elaborated security model is indispensable to the construction of provably secure cryptographic schemes, we should define a more reasonable and elaborated security model for CBE. Inspired by the improvements in the definitions of security notions for CL-PKE [25] and CBS [26] , we define a class of new security models for CBE under different security levels according to the power of the adversaries against CBE. Our definitions abolish the unnecessary restrictions in the existing security models, and also introduce the key replacement attack and the malicious-butpassive certifier attack. In the following, we give the concrete definitions of these security models and also investigate the relationships among them.
Oracles
We first define the oracles that an adversary against CBE may access and how each oracle query should be responded by a challenger C. We assume that C keeps a history of "query-answer" while interacting with the adversary.
− CB-RequestPublicKey: On input an identity id, the challenger C responds with the public key CB-PK for id. If the identity id has no associated public key, then C generates a public key CB-PK for id by running CB-SetKeyPair. − CB-ReplacePublicKey: The adversary can repeatedly replace the public key of any entity with any value of its choice. On input an identity id and a value CB-PK ' , the challenger C replaces the current public key CB-PK with
CB-PK '
. Note that the current value of a user's public key is used by C in any computations or responses to the adversary's requests. This oracle models the adversary's ability to convince a legitimate user to use an invalid public key and enables our security models to capture the public key replacement attack. − CB-ExtractPrivateKey: On input an identity id, the challenger C responds with the private key CB-SK for id. If the identity id has no associated private key, then C generates a private key CB-SK for id by running the algorithm CB-SetKeyPair. However, it is unreasonable to expect C to be able to respond to such a query if the public key CB-PK for id has already been replaced.
− CB-RequestCertificate: On input an index τ of a time period and an identity id, the challenger C responds with a certificate CB-Cert τ for id in the time period τ. If the identity id has no associated certificate in the time period τ, then C generates CB-Cert τ by running CB-Certify. − CB-Decrypt: Considering the different levels of the decrypting power the challenger C may have, the decryption oracle can be divided into following three types: CB-StrongDecrypt: On input an index τ of a time period, an identity id, and a ciphertext C, the challenger responds with the correct decryption of C, even if the public key for id has been replaced. This is a rather strong property for the security model of CBE. After all, the challenger may no longer know the correct corresponding private key. However, this capability may give the adversary more power in breaking the scheme. For further discussion of this feature (but in CL-PKE setting), see [2] . CB-NormalDecrypt: On input an index τ of a time period, an identity id, and a ciphertext C, the challenger C responds with the decryption of the ciphertext C using the original private key for id and the certificate for id in the time period τ. Note that the functionality of this oracle can be achieved by a strong decryption oracle. CB-WeakDecrypt: On input an index τ of a time period, an identity id, a private key CB-SK and a ciphertext C, the challenger C responds with the decryption of the ciphertext C using CB-SK and the certificate for id in the time period τ. Note that the functionality of such an oracle also can be achieved by a strong decryption oracle.
Type-I Security
The Type-I security model of CBE is designed to protect against an uncertified user who dose not obtain a legitimate certificate from its certifier and is trying to gain some information about a message from its encryption. According to the attack power of such an adversary against CBE, we classify Type-I security into three levels: weak Type-I (wType-I) security, normal Type-I (nType-I) security and strong Type-I (sType-I) security.
Weak Type-I Security. We first define the wType-I security model for CBE. This security notion is defined by a following weak IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I in which Type-I adversary A I can not replace public keys of any users and make the strong decryption queries, but may request public keys and certificates, extract private keys and make normal or weak decryption queries: Normal Type-I Security. Different from the wType-I security model, the nType-I security model gives Type-I adversary to the ability to replace the public keys of any users with values of its choice. However, it also prevents the adversary from querying the strong decryption oracle. This kind of security is defined by a normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I which is very similar to the weak IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I, but with the following two differences:
− A I can query CB-ReplacePublicKey on any identity;
− A I cannot query CB-ExtractPrivateKey on any identity if the corresponding public key has been replaced; Definition 3. A CBE scheme is said to be nType-I secure if no probabilistic and polynomial-time adversary can have non-negligible advantage in winning the normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I.
Strong Type-I Security. Finally, we define the strongest Type-I security notion for CBE, namely the sType-I security. In this kind of security model, the adversary is allowed to query the strong decryption oracle. That is, the adversary is able to obtain the correct decryption of any ciphertext under the public key chosen by itself without providing the corresponding private key. The sType-I security is defined by a strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I which is very similar to the normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I, but with the following two differences:
− A I can query the oracle CB-StrongDecrypt rather than CB-NormalDecrypt and CB-WeakDecrypt;
Definition 4.
A CBE scheme is said to be sType-I secure if no probabilistic and polynomial-time adversary can have non-negligible advantage in winning the strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I.
Type-II Security
The Type-II security model for CBE is designed to protect against an honestbut-curious certifier who always generates its master key and the public system parameters honestly according to the scheme specification. Hence, a Type-II adversary in this security model is equipped with the master key and needs not to access the oracle RequestCertificate, as it is able to compute these values by itself. As the Type-I security, the Type-II security also can be classified into three levels: weak Type-II (wType-II) security, normal Type-II (nType-II) security and strong Type-II (sType-II) security.
Weak Type-II Security. The wType-II security model for CBE is defined by a following weak IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II in which Type-II adversary A II can not replace any user's public key, but may request public keys, extract private keys and make normal decryption queries. Remark 2. Our definition of the wType-II security for CBE is very similar to the definition of Type-II security for CBE in [12] . The only difference is that the Type-II adversary in our definition is allowed to work with multiple public keys and to select any one of them for the challenge, while such type of adversary in [12] is given only a specific public key by the challenger at the beginning of the game.
Normal Type-II Security. Different from the wType-II security model, the nType-II security model gives Type-II adversary to the ability to replace the public keys of any users with values of its choice. But it also prevents the adversary from querying the strong decryption oracle. This kind of security model is defined by a normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II which is very similar to the weak IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II, but with the following two differences:
− A II cannot query CB-ExtractPrivateKey on any identity if the corresponding public key has been replaced; − A II cannot be challenged on an identity for which it has replaced the public key.
Definition 6.
A CBE scheme is said to be nType-II secure if no probabilistic and polynomial-time adversary can have non-negligible advantage in winning the normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II.
Strong Type-II Security. In the nType-I security model, if Type-II adversary is allowed to query the strong decryption oracle, then we will obtain the sType-II security notion for CBE. The sType-II security is defined by a strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II which is very similar to the normal IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II, but with the following two differences:
− A II can query CB-StrongDecrypt rather than CB-NormalDecrypt and CBWeakDecrypt;
Definition 7.
A CBE scheme is said to be sType-II secure if no probabilistic and polynomial-time adversary can have non-negligible advantage in winning the strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II.
Malicious-but-passive Type-II Security
We now define a much stronger Type-II security model for CBE, namely the malicious-but-passive Type-II (mType-II) security model. This kind of model is designed to protect against a malicious-but-passive certifier who may generate its master key and the public system parameters maliciously at the setup stage of the system, instead of generating its master key and the public system parameters honestly according to the scheme specification and suddenly becoming malicious as the honest-but-curious certifier in the Type-II security model. So an adversary in this security model controls the generation of the master key and the public system parameters, and that of any user's certificate. The malicious-but-passive attack by the trusted third party was first introduced to the security of CL-PKC by Au et al. [27] , in which they showed that the malicious-but-passive KGC in some certificateless schemes like [2] can generate its master key and the public system parameters maliciously so that it can decrypt all the ciphertext in the system without knowing the users' private key. The general mType-II security model for CBE is expressed by the following malicious-but-passive IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II: As the Type-II security for CBE, we also can define three different levels of mType-II security: weak mType-II (wmType-II) security, normal mType-II (nmType-II) security and strong mType-II (smType-II) security. Since these security notions can be defined in the same way as the Type-II security, we omit the concrete definitions here.
Relation among Security Models for CBE
We now study the relation among the above different security models for CBE. Firstly, according the attack power of the adversaries in each security model, it is not difficult to deduce the following relations:
In the above, A ⇒ B denotes that a CBE scheme which is A secure must be B secure, and A ⇒ B ∧ C denotes that a CBE scheme which is A secure must both be B secure and C secure. It is clear that the sType-I security and the smType-II security are the strongest security levels that a CBE scheme could achieve. We note that all the existing CBE schemes are proved secure using the common observational or black-box proof technique which requires that an algorithm (also called a solver) should use an attacker as a subroutine in solving a mathematical problem. However, the following two theorems state that the black-box security proof technique may not be used to prove a CBE scheme to both be sType-I secure and smType-II (or sType-II) secure in the standard model. Theorem 1. In the standard model, if there exists a black-box proof for the sType-I security of a CBE scheme, then that CBE scheme must not be nmType-II secure.
Proof. Assume that there exists a CBE scheme which is sType-I secure. Then, there exists a PPT challenger C I for the strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I such that C I successfully simulates the strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I with overwhelming probability and no sType-I adversaies win the game with nonnegligible advantage. According to Definition 4 in Section 3. Since C I successfully simulates the strong IND-CB-CCA2 Game-I with overwhelming probability, it implies that C I will simulate the strong decryption oracle successfully and output the correct message M * = M b with overwhelming probability to respond the strong decryption oracle query by A II .
Hence, A II will output the right answer at a non-negligible probability. This proves that the advantage of A II in the normal and malicious-but-passive IND-CB-CCA2 Game-II is non-negligible.
The above theorem shows that the sType-I security and the nmType-II security cannot co-exist on any CBE schemes without random oracles in the black-box proof. Since the smType-II security implies the nmType-II security, so the sType-I security and the smType-II security also cannot co-exist on any CBE schemes without random oracles in the black-box proof. Similarly, a sType-I challenger must be an nType-II attacker in the standard model. That is, the sType-I security and the sType-II security also cannot coexist on any CBE scheme in the standard model.
Theorem 2.
In the standard model, if there exists a black-box proof for the sType-I security of a CBE scheme, then it must not be nType-II secure.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 1 only with some minor modifications and hence is omitted.
Remark 3.
It should be noted that we may prove a CBE scheme to both be sType-I secure and smType-II secure (or sType-II secure) in the random oracle using the black-box security proving technique. For example, the CBE scheme in [28] is proved to be sType-I secure and sType-II secure in the random oracle. This result does not contradict our conclusions above. After all, the game challenger in the random oracle is always assumed to have the full control of some specified random oracles while the one in the standard model has no such power.
Remark 4.
The game hopping proof technique [29, 30] may used to prove a CBE scheme to both be sType-I secure and smType-II secure (or sType-II secure) in the standard model. Recently, Dent et al. [31] successfully used this new proof technique to prove their CL-PKE scheme to both be strong Type-I and Type-II secure in the standard model. It makes us believe that the sType-I security and the smType-II (or sType-II) security can co-exist on a CBE scheme without random oracles in a game hopping proof.
Generic Construction of CBE from CL-PKE
In this section, we propose a new generic construction of CBE from CL-PKE, and prove the security of the certificate scheme CBE from the construction under different security levels.
Syntax of CL-PKE
We first briefly review the definition of CL-PKE. In the original work [2] , a CL-PKE scheme is defined by seven algorithms (CL-Setup, CL-PartialKeyExtract, CL-SetSecretValue, CL-SetPrivateKey, CL-SetPublicKey, CL-Encrypt, CLDecrypt) such that: As discussed in [27] , this new approach of defining CL-PKE schemes is more versatile than the original seven-algorithm definition in [2] , and still maintains the unique feature of CL-PKE schemes. Actually, in [25] , Dent also suggested the similar method to construct a CL-PKE scheme by replacing the algorithms CL-SetSecretValue and CL-SetPublicKey with a single algorithm CLSetUserKey and showed that a CL-PKE scheme presented in the old formulation can also be presented in the new formulation. Our generic construction will adopt the five-algorithm definition of CL-PKE.
In the above generic construction, we use the algorithms CL-UserKeyGen and CL-PartialKeyGen to generate the public/private key pair and the certificate in the CBE scheme Π CB respectively. We refer the readers to [25, 27] for the security definitions of CL-PKE.
Theorem 3.
Suppose that the CL-PKE scheme ΠP CL is strong Type-I † secure (resp., weak Type-Ia † secure), then the CBE scheme Π CB from the above generic construction is sType-I secure (resp., nType-I secure). We show that all of the above events never occur in B I 's simulation. 
||CL-PK
* is an identity which never appears in the identity information space of the scheme Π x Z as the private key CB-SK for a user and generates the corresponding public key as CB-PK = (X, σ) where X = h x and σ is the Schnorr one-time signature of the message id||X using x as the signing key and (h, X) as the verification key. We refer the readers to [33] for the details about the generation of the public key. 
. Next is our conclusion about the security of the above CBE scheme.
It then computes the plaintext as
Theorem 6. The above CBE scheme is nType-I and nmType-II secure if the DBDH assumption holds in (G, G T ) and the hash function H is collision resistant.
Proof. The correctness of this theorem can be proved by combining Theorem 3, Theorem 4 in this paper, and Theorem 5, Theorem 6 in [32] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we made further observations on CBE and its generic construction from CL-PKE. We first analyzed the existing security models of CBE and gave new definitions of the security models for CBE under different security levels according to the attacking power of the adversaries against CBE. Our definitions are more reasonable and elaborated compared with other existing ones. We then proposed a generic construction of CBE from CL-PKE which is secure in the standard model if the underlying CL-PKE scheme satisfies certain security. Finally, we gave a concrete conversion from an existing CL-PKE scheme to a CBE scheme using our generic construction.
